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Abstract:
It is commonly argued that a better investment climate reform – that is, lower
distortions in the institutional, policy and regulatory environment in which firms 
operate - lead to discernible improvements in firm performance. In this paper, we 
argue that effective state business relations condition better investment climate 
outcomes and that the deeper institutional determinants of firm performance are the 
former. We examine the effect of effective state-business relations of total factor 
productivity (TFP) for formal sector firms in India for the years 2000-01 and 2004-05 
and find support for this hypothesis. 
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1I. INTRODUCTION
One of the key tenets of the Washington Consensus view of economic policy making 
is that investment climate reform – that is improvements in ‘the institutional, policy 
and regulatory environment in which firms operate’1 – lead to discernible 
improvements in firm performance and consequently, an increase in economic 
growth. There has been a large empirical literature that is adduced to support the 
proposition that investment climate reform can lead to productivity improvements and 
higher economic growth.  Several studies in this literature show that various 
indicators of a poor investment – such as power supply interruptions, high regulatory 
burden in the form of time firm management spend with government inspectors, 
corruption, and poor access to finance – have a negative effect on firm productivity 
and growth.2 Recommendations to reform the investment climate are now an 
indispensable component of the standard policy advice that World Bank and the IMF 
offer to developing countries.
The Washington Consensus proposition that investment climate reform can lead to 
higher productivity and overall growth has not been without its critics. There have 
been two main sets of criticisms levelled at the investment climate literature. Firstly, 
as Moore and Schmitz (2008, p. 10) argue, “the core conceptual problem with (the) 
orthodoxy is that government and political power are viewed primarily as persistent 
threats to capital, investment and economic growth. From that perspective, the policy 
mission is to curtail the influence of political power through formal rules, laws and 
institutions. If that mission fails, politicians are expected at least to maltreat the
private economy, and possibly to loot it, and thus, undercut economic growth.”   
Thus, there is a strong assumption in the literature that the state, by its very nature, is 
always predatory, and cannot be developmental in most instances of its 
manifestations. This is contrary to an alternate view that takes the position that ‘good 
growth-enhancing relations between business and government elites are possible’ 
(Maxfield and Schneider 1997, Harriss 2006).  That collaborative state-business 
relations can be growth-enhancing has been reflected in a long-standing literature in 
political science and in political economy (e.g., Amsden 1989, Evans 1995).
                                               
1 See Dollar et al., 2005, p. 1.
2 For comprehensive surveys of the literature, see Dethier et al. (2008) and Commander and Trinn 
(2008). 
2A second criticism of the investment climate literature is that it confuses cause and 
effect by focusing on the outcomes of effective state action, rather than the underlying 
structural factors that determine these outcomes (Carlin et al. 2008). Thus, better 
quality provision of electricity or lower corruption is more likely to occur when 
governments have a strong interest in promoting private sector development, and 
when they signal their commitment to the growth of the private sector via better 
public good provision and a lower degree of rent seeking activities. An important 
limitation of focusing on the outcomes of effective state action, rather than their 
determinants, is that very often, and particularly in recent years, there has been an 
improvement in investment climate indicators in many developing countries without a 
corresponding improvement in economic performance (Commander and Trinn 2008). 
We would argue that this is due to governments not being credible in their signalling 
to the private sector that they are really interested in the growth of the latter, or where 
new formal institutions have brought into place when the informal institutions are not 
complementary to these formal institutions (Steer and Sen 2008). As an opposite case, 
there have been instances of developing countries (such as China and Vietnam) where 
there has been a surge in private sector investment and growth without an ostensible 
improvement in investment climate measures (Moore and Scmitz 2008). This again in 
our view is due to the possibility that investors are more interested in the state’s 
overall commitment to growth oriented outcomes, and that the latter may over-ride 
certain weaknesses in the investment climate such as insecurity of formal property 
rights and high degrees of corruption.  
In this paper, we dig deeper into the determinants of better investment climate 
outcomes by focusing on their underlying causes, which we argue are effective state 
business relations. In our view, a synergistic relationship between the state and the 
business sector, which is based on strong and well organised states and private sector 
associations, is more likely to lead to the provision of public goods such as roads and 
electricity, and a lower regulatory burden on the private sector. In the next section, we 
argue why this is the case, and why effective state business relations may improve 
firm performance, and hence, overall economic welfare.
Our empirical context is India, which provides us a fertile empirical ground to 
examine the relationship between effective state business relations and economic 
3performance at the micro level.3 Given India’s federal political structure, we would 
expect to see wide variations in the manner Indian state governments interact with the 
business sector. Given the nature of economic reforms in India, which has been 
gradualist since their onset in the 1980s, and the political space these reforms 
provided to state governments to follow their own paths with specific economic 
policies (within certain constraints), we would expect significant time variation in 
effective state business relations across Indian states.4
The second advantage of using India as a case-study is the availability of firm-level 
data for the formal/organised sector. We have access to unit record data from the 
Annual Survey of Industries (ASI) for the formal sector for the years 2000-01 and 
2004-05.     
The rest of the paper is in six sections. In the next section, we set out the theoretical 
argument why effective state business relations matter for economic performance. In 
Section III, we describe the measure of state-business relations in India, drawing from 
the work of Cali, Mitra and Purohit (2009) (henceforth, CMP). Section IV describes 
the firm-level data and the methodology. In Section V, we discuss the results of our 
analysis. Section VI concludes. 
                                               
3 In the Indian case, a handful of studies have examined the relationship between investment climate 
and economic performance at the sub-national level using firm or industry data (Dollar et al., 2002; 
Veermani and Goldar, 2004; and World Bank, 2004). These studies find that states with better 
investment climate plays a significant role in productivity growth. 
4 Dollar et al. (2002) examine the effects of standard investment climate variables on firm productivity 
across states in India and find that less reliable power supply and inferior internet connectivity in poor 
investment climate states account for a quarter of the TFP differences across states and that a tenth of 
the differences reflect greater regulatory burden in the same states. Using a more expanded sample of 
firms which includes Bangladesh, China and Pakistan, Dollar et al. (2005) obtain similar results. 
4II. WHY DO EFFECTIVE STATE-BUSINESS RELATIONS MATTER 
FOR FIRM PERFORMANCE?
The literature on state-business relations takes the following elements as essential 
characteristics of effective state-business relations (see Maxfield and Schneider 
(1997), Chapter 1).
 Transparency: the flow of accurate and reliable information, both ways, between 
business and government.
 Reciprocity: the capacity and autonomy of state actions to secure improved 
performance in return for subsidies.
 Credibility:  when capitalists are able to believe what state actors say.
Effective SBRs as characterised above can affect firm performance through fulfilling 
a number of economic functions. Firstly, they can help to solve information related 
market and co-ordination failures in areas such as skill development or infrastructure 
provision. For instance, business associations or government departments may co-
ordinate and disperse information among stakeholders. 
Secondly, effective SBRs provide a check and balance function on government 
policies and tax and expenditure plans. Thus, effective SBRs may help to ensure that 
the provision of infrastructure is appropriate and of good quality. The design of 
effective government policies and regulations depends, among other things, on input 
from and consultation with the private sector. Regular sharing of information between 
the state and businesses ensures that private sector objectives are met with public 
action and that local level issues are fed into higher level policy processes. The 
private sector can identify constraints, opportunities, and possible policy options for 
creating incentives, lowering investment risks, and reducing the cost of doing 
business. More efficient institutions and rules and regulations might be achieved 
through policy advocacy which could reduce the costs and risks faced by firms and 
enhance productivity.
5Finally, effective state-business relations and membership of business association may 
help to reduce policy uncertainty. Firms operate in an uncertain environment and 
frequently face risk and resource shortages. They undertake decisions concerning 
technology, inputs, and production facilities based on anticipated market conditions 
and profitability. Uncertainty can have significant negative effects on investment, 
when investment involves large sunk and irreversible costs and there is the option to 
delay the decision to make the investment until further information becomes available 
(Dixit and Pindyck 1994). Businesses that have a better relation with government may 
be able to anticipate policy decisions. 
Hisahiro (2005) argues that various forms of information and resources, which are 
dispersed among entities in the public and private sector, need to be integrated in a 
more sophisticated way to jointly coordinate policies and provide better public 
services. It is this combination of insulation and connectedness that minimises the 
risks and enhances the effectiveness of economic policies. Hence, appropriate 
government capacity and policy, which is necessary to support private sector 
development and promote economic growth, can be enabled by good state–business 
relations and productive public-private sector dialogue.
Thus, effective state-business relations can enhance firm performance by positively 
affecting the two proximate determinants of firm growth – the rate of factor 
accumulation and the growth of total factor productivity. Greater transparency in the 
flow of information between state actors and the business sector leads both to a better 
allocation of investments by the business sector to their most productive uses and, by 
reducing policy uncertainty in the minds of investors, a higher rate of investment. 
Higher credibility of state actions lead to less problems of time and dynamic 
inconsistency of government policies, providing a more favourable environment for 
investment to occur.  Reciprocity ensures improved performance by private sector 
actors in return for subsidies and the provision of public goods, contributing to higher 
productivity growth.  
6In summary, effective state-business relations can mitigate both market failures and 
government failures which are pervasive in most developing countries, and by doing 
so, bring about an increase in the performance of firms.5
III. MEASURING STATE BUSINESS RELATIONS IN INDIA
Te Velde (2006) was the pioneering study to develop measures of SBRs quality. He 
argues that an SBR index should have four components, which reflect the main 
aspects of effective SBRs: 
1) the way in which the private sector is organised vis-à-vis the public sector;
2) the way in which the public sector is organised vis-à-vis the private sector;
3) the practice and institutionalisation of SBRs;
4) the avoidance of harmful collusive behaviour between the two sectors.
Each of the aspects mentioned above is captured through a SBR sub-index which in 
turn is derived from data on variables reflecting the mentioned aspects. The various 
SBR sub-indices are then combined to arrive at an overall index of SBR. CMP
measure SBR along the above four dimensions for 15 Indian states using both primary 
and secondary data. We describe below the manner CMP operationalise the 
measurement of SBR in India.
The role of the private sector in SBR 
CMP measure the role of the private sector via the quality and effectiveness of the 
umbrella business association and two sector based business associations, as follows:
a) Whether the private sector association has a website or not: The variable takes 
a value of zero in any year in which the organisation does not have a website 
and 1 otherwise. This is likely to proxy for the quality of  the organisational 
structure as well as its outside visibility. Evidence from their fieldwork 
                                               
5 See Qureshi and Te Velde 2007 and Sen and Te Velde 2009 for evidence that improvements in state 
business relations improve economic performance both at the micro and macro levels, for Sub Saharan 
Africa.
7confirms that organisations appearing to be more structured and organised 
have had an active website in place for a longer time.
b) How frequently the website is updated: Again, this captures the efficiency of 
internal processes (which makes frequent updates possible) as well as the level 
of activity of the organisation. The need for updating the website more 
frequently should increase with the intensity of the organisation’s activity. 
c) The variable office_premise, takes the value of 1 if the office is owned and 0 
otherwise. This variable proxies the level of the organisation’s resources as 
well as the extent to which the association is willing to invest in costly 
physical assets. 
The role of the public sector in SBR
CMP measure the role of the public sector in SBR by the presence of state 
owned or state participated productive corporations, which are investment 
promotion agencies, Financial, Infrastructure Development and Tourism 
Development Corporations. These represent important types of pro-business 
engagements with benefits for all sectors. They construct a cumulative sub-
index ranging in value between 0 and 1 which is the average of four dummy 
variables, one for each organisation. At any point of time the dummy for an 
organisation takes the value of 1 if it is in place and 0 otherwise. 
CMP also assess the role of the public sector via the governments’ signalling of their 
relative priorities through the allocation of public resources. In their work, they focus 
on two types of state revenue expenditures: expenditure on economic services as a 
ratio of total government expenditures and expenditure on industries as a ratio of total 
expenditures on economic services. 
The interaction between states and businesses
8CMP measure the interaction between state governments and the business sector in 
two ways::
a) Index of labour regulation:
This is the index constructed by Besley and Burgess (2004). The authors score 
each state level act on labour regulation as anti-worker (assigning -1), pro-worker 
(1) or neutral (0). In this way they produce a yearly cumulative index which may 
proxy for the relative effectiveness of the mentioned aspect of SBR. The argument 
is that more effective SBRs  would allow employers to be more influential 
affecting on government policies and would get reflected in more pro-employer 
labour market regulation. 
b) Stamp Duty:
As a measure of distortionary taxation at the state level, we use the level of stamp 
duty over time.
Mechanisms to avoid collusive behaviour 
CMP use the following measures to capture the transparency of SBRs: 
a) The gross output of firms belonging to delicensed industries as a proportion 
of total industrial GDP (data on delicensing from Aghion et al., 2006; data on
firms by sector in the Annual Survey of Industries): The License Raj was a 
system of centralised controls regulating entry and production activity.
Delicensing introduced competition and reduced rent-seeking by corporations 
entrenched with public powers. As the decision of what industries to delicense 
was made at the central level, this effectively provides an exogenous source of 
change in the possible extent of collusive behaviour at the state level.
b) Whether the private sector umbrella association has a regular publication
informing its members. This measure proxies for the transparency of the 
organisation’s activities. Higher transparency would be associated with lower 
probability of collusive behaviour which may harm business not entrenched 
with public authorities. As in the case of the organisation’s website, the 
9frequency with which the publication is produced and distributed would also 
determine the level of transparency in the association’s activities. 
As CMP correctly argue, the indices constructed through these variables have two 
main advantages over the traditional investment climate indicators. First, they cover a 
larger time span than any other indicators on India states. This allows one to examine 
the evolution of the relevant economic institution over different periods. Second, by 
not being based on firms’ perceptions, they avoid the measurement error problem 
typical of subjective survey response data. Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) argue 
that the likely causal correlation of this measurement error with dependent variables 
may generate biased estimated coefficients. Carlin et al. (2006) explain along these 
lines the problem of interpreting the coefficients of standard cross-country regressions 
where a productivity or income measure is regressed on subjective constraints. 
To capture indicators of all four dimensions of the composite SBR index (Private 
Sector, Public Sector, SBR Practice, and anti-collusive behaviour), CMP conducted 
structured and semi-structured interviews with business associations in each state and 
state government officials from the industry department of almost every state. Some 
data was also collected from secondary sources.  The data used in the construction of 
SBR index was a time series for 16 states of India for 1975 - 20086.  
There are three separate weighting processes involved in the construction of the SBR 
index. First, those private sector variables for which data are available for the 
mentioned three associations in each state need to be weighted to generate an 
aggregate private sector variable. CMP have experimented with different types of 
weights to limit the degree of subjectivity in this weighting decision, thus effectively 
generating different variants of the variables. While CMP used different weighting 
procedures in the construction of the SBR private variable, we use the weighting 
procedure where the apex business association is assigned a value of 0.5 and the two 
sectoral associations are assigned a value of 0.25 each.7
                                               
6 As the firm level data used in the paper merges the data for Uttarakhand with Uttar Pradesh, we have 
done the similar exercise for the SBR index. It should be noted that the firm level data is only available 
for 2000-01 and 2004-05. 
7 We have experimented with different weights for the apex and the two sectoral business associations 
in the construction of the SBR private variable with no change in the results. 
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In Figure 1 , we present the period averaged SBR measures for 1994-2000 and 2001-
2005. As is clear, there are strong differences in the effectiveness of state business 
relations across Indian states. These differences seem to have persisted over time.
Figure 1: State Business Relations, 1994-2000 and 2001-2005 across Indian states
Source: CMP (2009)
IV. DATA AND METHODOLOGY
Data:
We use unit level data for the formal manufacturing sectors for two years – 2000-01
and  2004-05. Data are drawn from the Annual Survey of Industries (ASI) published 
by the Central Statistical Organisation (CSO). The ASI is the census survey of all the 
formal manufacturing units for all the industries across all the states. The data is 
collected every year from all the units registered under the Indian Factories Act of 
1948. 8 CSO is the agency that collects information on various aspects of the 
functioning units. The information collected include - gross output, number of 
                                               
8 The enterprises which employ less than 20 workers without the use of electricity or 10 workers with 
the use of the use of electricity or are not producing hazardous substances (such as chemicals) fall 
under the unorganized/informal sector, as these are firms that are not required to register with the 
authorities under the Indian Factories Act of 1948. 
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workers, gross fixed assets, electricity and materials consumed, ownership, profit etc. 
at the unit level. The data are in the form of repeated cross-sections, and not panel 
data. This is because the CSO do not reveal the identity of the firm/plant in the unit 
record data. 
Methodology
Our variable of interest is the measure of state-business relations that we described in 
Section III and its effect on total factor productivity (TFP). To test the effect of SBR 
on TFP, we run augmented production functions as follows:
isjisisjisjisj eSBRaLaKaaY  3210     (1)
Where i is industry, s is state and j is firm. 
Y is gross value added, K is capital stock, L is total number of employees, SBR is our 
measure of state business relations, δi are industry fixed effects and e is the error term. 
We would expect that a3 is positive and significant – i.e., more effective SBR 
(as captured by higher SBR score) should lead to improved total factor productivity. 
The industry fixed effects capture industry-specific differences in technology 
which would be correlated with TFP. They also capture other industry specific 
differences which would affect TFP such as differences in market structure and trade 
orientation. We first estimate equation (1) using Ordinary Least Squares, and with 
robust heteroskedasticity constant standard errors. However, it is possible that 
unobserved technology shocks may be correlated with both, capital stock and output, 
leading to a bias in estimate of a1. In order to correct for this, we also estimate 
equation (1) using two-stage least squares with materials as an instrument for capital 
stock. 
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V. RESULTS
Table 1 summarises the descriptive statistics of the two years - 2000-01 and 2004-05. 
For the 2000-01 round, we have data on over 24000 firms. For the 2004-05 round, we 
have data on over 30 000 firms.9 There is variation in value added, capital stock and 
employment for the firms in our sample for both years. We also observe that the 
summary statistics on value added, capital stock, employment, fuel and materials are 
not very different for the two years. The SBR public and SBR practice variables have 
remained more or less same, while the SBR private variable reported a significant 
improvement over the period 1994-95 – 2000-01.
Table 1. Summary Statistics
VARIABLES No. of 
Observations
Mean SD MIN MAX
2000-20001 ROUND
Log GVA 24361 14.72 2.21 0.62 24.00
Log Capital 
Stock
24361 14.76 2.72 -0.25 24.75
Log 
Employment
24361 3.88 1.55 0 10.63
Log Fuel 24361 13.00 2.34 3.44 22.24
Log Material 24361 15.31 2.93 1.96 24.88
Log SBR 24361 0.177 0.017 0.135 0.210
Log SBRpvt 24361 0.123 0.025 0.067 0.168
Log SBRpub 24361 0.194 0.024 0.124 0.233
Log SBRpract 24361 0.195 0.030 0.111 0.236
Log SBRcollu 24361 0.200 0.034 0.105 0.264
2004-2005 Round
Log GVA 31014 14.70 2.17 2.83 24.25
Log Capital 
Stock
31014 14.68 2.67 -0.42 25.66
Log 
Employment
31014 3.79 1.51 0 10.73
Log Fuel 31014 12.84 2.28 3.29 22.34
Log Material 31014 15.29 2.99 2.08 26.45
Log SBR 31014 0.188 0.020 0.132 0.225
Log SBRpvt 31014 0.161 0.044 0.067 0.245
Log SBRpub 31014 0.195 0.025 0.107 0.231
Log SBRpract 31014 0.196 0.027 0.128 0.236
Log SBRcollu 31014 0.215 0.026 0.133 0.252
                                               
9 We drop all firms with zero or negative employment or output or capital stock.
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Table 2 presents the regression results for the years 2000-01 and 2004-05 obtained 
using both OLS and IV estimation. In Col. (2) and (3), we present the OLS estimates 
for the years 2000-01 and 2004-05. The coefficients on labour and capital inputs have 
the expected signs and are statistically significant at the one per cent level. We find 
that the coefficient on the SBR measure is positive and significant in all the cases. In 
Col. (4) and (5), we include industry dummies with no significant change in the 
results. To correct for the possible endogeneity bias associated with production 
function estimation, we estimate the equation using instrumental variable (IV) 
method. The results of this IV exercise with industry dummies are reported in Col. (6) 
and (7). We find that the coefficient on the SBR variable is positive but not significant 
for the year 2000-01 while the coefficient value remained significant for the year 
2004-05.  
In Table 3, we re-do the IV analysis for the different components of our SBR 
measure. We want to examine whether our finding is driven by specific dimension of 
SBR measure. We find that SBR private and practice components have a positive and 
significant effect on TFP for 2004-05. We also find SBR collusive component has a 
similar effect on TFP but for 2000-01. However, SBR public seems to have a negative 
and significant effect on TFP for the year 2000-01. This latter finding may possibly 
reflect the fact that setting up of corporations by the state and public expenditure on 
economic sectors has not led to the provision of high quality public goods that matter 
for private sector performance. Nevertheless, it is clear that SBR private, practice and 
collusive dimensions of the overall SBR measure have contributed to the overall 
positive impact of effective SBR on firm performance. 
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Table 2. Regression Results, OLS and IV
Variables OLS Estimates IV estimates
2000-01 2004-05 2000-01 2004-05 2000-01 2004-05
Constant 6.21*
(67.92)
6.25*
(82.44)
-- -- -- --
Log Capital Stock 0.354*
(65.99)
0.35*
(73.90)
0.32*
(54.18)
0.31*
(62.05)
0.71*
(72.89)
0.65*
(81.56)
Log Employment 0.767*
(102.01)
0.79*
(123.11)
0.83*
(99.33)
0.85*
(126.10)
0.33*
(25.25)
0.42*
(39.30)
Log SBR 1.782*
(4.33)
1.66*
(5.59)
1.12*
(2.79)
2.28*
(8.35)
0.45
(0.93)
1.37*
(4.30)
Industry 
Dummies?
No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-square 0.81 0.82 0.83 0.85 0.74 0.78
Number of 
Observations
24361 31014 24361 31014 24361 31014
Note: t-values are in the parentheses. 
Table 3. IV estimates: SBR Components
Variables SBR Private SBR Public SBR Practice SBR Collusive
Log Capital 
Stock
0.71*
(71.49)
0.65*
(80.60)
0.71*
(72.68)
0.65*
(81.34)
0.71*
(72.78)
0.65*
(80.91)
0.71*
(72.35)
0.65*
(80.76)
Log 
Employment
0.33*
(25.09)
0.43*
(39.53)
0.34*
(25.28)
0.42*
(39.46)
0.33*
(25.23)
0.42*
(38.88)
0.33*
(24.75)
0.43*
(39.28)
Log SBR 0.43
(1.39)
1.02*
(7.27)
-0.67*
(2.09)
-0.24
(0.98)
0.07
(0.27)
0.65*
(2.88)
0.86*
(3.89)
-0.32
(1.36)
Industry 
Dummies?
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-square 0.74 0.78 0.74 0.78 0.74 0.78 0.74 0.78
Number of 
Observations
24361 31014 24361 31014 24361 31014 24361 31014
VI. CONCLUSIONS
It is commonly argued that a better investment climate reform – that is,  lower 
distortions in the institutional, policy and regulatory environment in which firms 
operate - lead to discernible improvements in firm performance. In this paper, we 
argue that effective state business relations condition better investment climate 
outcomes and that the deeper institutional determinants of firm performance are the 
former. We examine the effect of effective state-business relations of total factor 
productivity (TFP) for formal manufacturing sector firms in India for the years 1994-
95 and 2000-01, and find support for this hypothesis. We find a positive effect of 
state-business relations on TFP of the formal manufacturing sector. 
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Our disaggregated analysis of which dimension of SBR matter most for firm 
performance suggest that the SBR private, practice and collusive components 
contribute to the overall impact of effective SBR on firm performance. However, SBR 
public seems to have a negative effect on TFP. Thus our results suggest that it is
important to improve the quality of public goods provided by the sub-national state 
governments which can further enhance the impact of other sub-components. 
Overall, our finding suggests that collaborative relationships between the state and the 
business sector can be performance enhancing and the goal of policy should be to 
strengthen such relationships. 
16
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